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28 
PUNISHMENT WITHOUT PROCESS:  “VICTIM 
IMPACT” PROCEEDINGS FOR DEAD 
DEFENDANTS 
Bruce A. Green* & Rebecca Roiphe** 
INTRODUCTION  
When women accuse powerful men of sexual assault, there is increasing 
public pressure to resolve any doubts in the accusers’ favor before the 
criminal process is over, if not from the outset.  Private individuals and 
institutions often do so without worrying about due process, but it is different 
for the trial court, where the presumption of innocence is supposed to apply.  
This is especially true where public shaming and the accompanying 
reputational consequences already constitute a kind of punishment.  
Although they may be sympathetic to accusers, especially those whose cause 
is championed by a strong and popular social movement, courts should not 
succumb to pressure to undermine the presumption of innocence. 
This Essay analyzes two federal court decisions involving accused sex 
offender Jeffrey Epstein.  In these cases, the district judges—seemingly in 
response to social pressure—undermined the presumption of innocence by 
offering Epstein’s accusers the chance to make the equivalent of “victim 
impact statements” after Epstein’s suicide in prison.  The Essay argues that 
courts have an obligation to respect the presumption of innocence even after 
a criminal defendant’s death.  While the living accusers have valid and 
compelling interests, it is inappropriate for the trial court to recognize these 
interests by allowing victim impact proceedings when criminal charges have 
never been resolved—and especially, where, as here, no criminal trial had 
even begun.  Epstein’s accusers are sympathetic, and public opinion supports 
their struggle—often seemingly putting absolute faith in their allegations.  
But the public outcry and accompanying social movement should not have 
dictated how courts conduct courtroom proceedings.  Judges must respect the 
presumption of innocence, including after a criminal defendant’s death ends 
the possibility of a criminal prosecution. 
After Epstein died while awaiting trial on criminal charges, the prosecution 
moved to dismiss the indictment in federal court in New York, and the district 
court judge ultimately granted the motion.  But first, the judge ordered a 
hearing to enable Epstein’s accusers to testify in court about the pain and 
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suffering that the defendant’s alleged crimes caused them.  Before the 
hearing, we published a short op-ed pointing out that the law does not 
authorize trial courts to commence such hearings before a criminal defendant 
is convicted, but only after a criminal defendant is found guilty and awaits 
sentencing.  “[N]ow that he is dead,” we submitted, “the criminal justice 
system is not the place for Epstein to be called to account.”1 
The judge disagreed.  Responding directly to our article, Judge Richard 
Berman asserted that the hearing had a legitimate purpose because he had 
discretion to continue the proceedings even in the dead defendant’s absence.  
That being so, he maintained that the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
(CVRA)2 required him “as a matter of law” to “consider the views of the 
victims in the case at the hearing . . . before deciding whether to grant the 
motion.”3  When he opened the hearing to Epstein’s accusers and their 
lawyers, however, there was no dispute about the motion.  The two sides 
recognized that the court had no choice but to dismiss the indictment, making 
the decision a ministerial task rather than a fact-finding mission.  
Nonetheless, before the judge so ruled, “[sixteen] women emotionally 
 
 1. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, The Judge in Epstein’s Case Should Not Turn the 
Dismissal into a Drama for the Victims, NYLJ (Aug. 26, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/26/the-judge-in-epsteins-case-should-not-
turn-the-dismissal-into-a-drama-for-the-victims/ [https://perma.cc/9G2Q-MY4X]. 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2018). 
 3. United States v. Epstein, 19 CR 490 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2019 Hearing tr., at 
6–7; see also id. at 5 (“[P]ublic hearings are exactly what judges do.  Hearings promote 
transparency and they provide the court with insights and information which the court might 
not otherwise be aware of.  The victims have been included in the proceeding today both 
because of their relevant experiences and because they should always be involved before 
rather than after the fact.”).  Judge Berman also levelled a somewhat misinformed personal 
attack.  At the hearing, the judge asserted, evidently based on an ex parte communication with 
an unidentified person, that Professor Green should have disclosed in the op-ed article that he 
“was counsel in one of the Epstein-related cases.” Id. at 5.  Afterwards, Professor Green wrote 
to Judge Berman to clarify the record, explaining that he had never been counsel to Epstein or 
his estate or to anyone in an Epstein-related case, but did serve as an expert witness, by way 
of expert declaration, in support of Professor Alan Dershowitz’s motion to disqualify David 
Boies and his law firm in Giuffre v. Dershowitz, a pending defamation case that might be 
described as “Epstein-related.” Letter from Bruce A. Green to Hon. Richard B. Berman (Aug. 
30, 2019).  He further explained:  “[m]y work as an expert witness, which concluded in June, 
did not involve my representation of, or advocacy on behalf of, Professor Dershowitz.  I did 
not serve as counsel or as an advocate on anyone’s behalf in co-authoring the law journal 
article.” Id.  Judge Berman responded, in a letter provided to the New York Post on the same 
day it was mailed (and days before it was received), with the view that the prior expert work 
(which the judge characterized as “advocacy”) should have been disclosed in the op-ed. Letter 
from Hon. Richard B. Berman to Bruce A. Green (Sept. 4, 2019), at 1; Emily Saul, Judge 
Feuds with Fordham Professor over Epstein Accuser Hearing, N.Y. POST (Sept. 4, 2019, 8:05 
PM), https://nypost.com/2019/09/04/judge-feuds-with-fordham-professor-over-epstein-
accuser-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/2DKG-2XJ4].  He also lamented that our “opinion piece 
may have been construed as an effort to chill Ms. Giuffre’s and Mr. Boies’ right to be heard 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 at the August 27, 2019 public hearing.” Letter from Hon. Richard B. 
Berman, supra, at 2.  The district court in Giuffre v. Dershowitz has since granted the 
disqualification motion. Giuffre v. Dershowitz, 19 Civ. 3317 (LAP), Opinion and Order, Oct. 
16, 2019.  We leave it to readers to form their own views on these collateral questions. 
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recounted their experiences being allegedly sexually abused” by Epstein, and 
lawyers read the statements of seven others.4 
Perhaps persuaded by our article but nevertheless sympathetic to the 
accusers’ wish for an opportunity to condemn Epstein in court, a federal 
district judge in Miami took a somewhat different approach.  Judge Kenneth 
Marra had been presiding for around a decade over litigation brought by 
some of Epstein’s accusers, who sought to set aside Epstein’s 2008 non-
prosecution agreement in the Southern District of Florida.5  Unlike the New 
York judge, Judge Marra concluded unequivocally that Epstein’s death 
ended the case.  With it ended the court’s possible authority to rescind the 
non-prosecution agreement:  “[a]s a result of Mr. Epstein’s death,” Judge 
Marra wrote, “there can be no criminal prosecution against him and the Court 
cannot consider granting this relief to the victims.”6  Nor could the Court 
grant any other relief to the accusers under the CVRA:  “[a]t this point,” the 
judge explained, “as to Mr. Epstein, there are no present or future CVRA 
rights of victims to protect.”7  Among other things, this meant that the court 
could not convene “a public court proceeding in which [the accusers] can 
make a victim impact statement,” even though the government had agreed to 
such a hearing.8  However, the judge acknowledged that the accusers and the 
government could voluntarily hold a “forum” attended by the news media 
“where the victims may express how their interaction with Mr. Epstein and 
his alleged co-conspirators affected them.”9  And while the “forum”—not a 
hearing—“can be conducted anywhere the parties choose,” the judge noted 
that the “forum [could] be before this Court.”10 
In both federal cases, the posthumous hearing or “forum” would serve as 
a form of court-authorized shaming for the deceased defendant (with the 
unproven idea that it would be therapeutic for his accusers) of the sort that 
ordinarily occurs in criminal proceedings, if at all, only after a criminal 
defendant has been convicted.  If the criminal defendant, who had never been 
 
 4. Kat Tenbarge, “I’ve Suffered and He Has Won”:  More Than 20 of Jeffrey Epstein’s 
Accusers Gave Emotional Testimonies in Court as Prosecutors Moved to Shut Down His Case, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:11 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/victims-jeffrey-
epstein-testimony-dismiss-indictment-court-hearing-federal-prosecutors-2019-8 
[https://perma.cc/VTX7-BBQ5].  The next day, two of the accusers’ lawyers defended the 
judge’s assertion that he was legally required to give Epstein’s accusers a public hearing 
before dismissing the indictment. Paul G. Cassell, & Bradley J. Edwards, Hearing on 
Dismissing Epstein Charges Was Not ‘Drama’ but Proper Respect for Victims, NYLJ (Aug. 
28, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/08/28/hearing-on-
dismissing-epstein-charges-was-not-drama-but-proper-respect-for-victims/ 
[https://perma.cc/NRK9-HT7Z] (maintaining that “crime victims’ voices must be heard 
throughout the process.”). 
 5. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (S.D. Fla. 2019); Doe v. United 
States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2013); Doe v. Epstein, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139535 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 6. Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. United States, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA, 
Opinion and Order, Sept. 16, 2019, at 5. 
 7. Id. at 8. 
 8. Id. at 3–4, 8. 
 9. Id. at 8, n.4. 
 10. Id. 
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tried, were still alive, due process concerns would bar the judges from using 
their courtrooms in this fashion.11  But the judges in Epstein’s cases, and 
most especially the New York case, assumed that fair process concerns fade 
into the background once the accused is dead. 
This Essay addresses the problem raised in these cases of how to reconcile 
due process concerns for deceased defendants with the interests of their 
accusers.  It also engages the perennial question of how to protect the rights 
of unpopular—even reviled—criminal defendants in the face of public 
condemnation.12  As others have recognized, the commitment to such rights 
is increasingly in jeopardy when social movements attempt to redress historic 
inequities toward less powerful and marginalized individuals and groups.13  
We argue, however, that courts cannot apply the presumption of innocence 
selectively.  If we expect courts to protect the due process rights of poor and 
powerless defendants, then judges must protect all criminal defendants’ 
procedural rights, even those of the rich and powerful. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  THE POSTHUMOUS PROCEEDINGS IN THE EPSTEIN CASES 
Federal victims’ rights law allows victims to be heard at sentencing 
proceedings in criminal cases.14  The Supreme Court has recognized that the 
impact of a crime on victims and their families is a relevant consideration for 
 
 11. Imagine for the moment that in a case involving a different defendant, the government 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, and moved to dismiss 
the indictment.  Suppose, for example, the court had suppressed essential evidence on 
constitutional grounds, and the appeals courts upheld the court’s decision, with the result that, 
although the prosecution and public were convinced of the defendant’s guilt, there was not 
enough admissible evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  And suppose that 
instead of granting the motion on the papers, as judges routinely do, a judge acknowledged 
that although he would ultimately dismiss the indictment, and that there was no conceivable 
basis to do otherwise, he would first hold a hearing in court for the benefit of the defendant’s 
accusers in order to give them a chance to assert the defendant’s guilt (without fear of a 
defamation action), to describe how the defendant harmed them, and to express their 
disappointment at the outcome.  Such a hearing seems indefensible.  The defendant would be 
entitled to a presumption of innocence.  The court could not impose punishment until the 
presumption was overcome, either by a guilty plea or a guilty verdict.  Ordering the hearing 
to give victims a forum would convey to the public the judge’s belief that the defendant was 
guilty, even though there had never been a guilty plea or trial and never would be.  And the 
hearing itself, while intended for the putative victims’ wellbeing, would also function to inflict 
punishment of the accused, even if not formal punishment. 
 12. See Jed Rakoff, How Can You Defend Those Crooks?, NYLJ (Sept. 25, 1990); see 
also HOW CAN YOU REPRESENT THOSE PEOPLE? (Abbe Smith & Monroe Freedman, eds., 
2013); Abbe Smith, Defending Those People, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 277 (2012). 
 13. See, e.g., Lara Bazelon, Put Away the Pitchforks Against Judge Persky, POLITICO 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/recall-judge-persky-
stanford-rapist-brock-turner-courts-214145 [https://perma.cc/H7PR-PECC] (arguing that the 
campaign to punish a judge for a lenient sentence against a privileged white man accused of 
sexual assault undermines the criminal process); Jeannie Suk Gerson, Unpopular Speech in a 
Cold Climate, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/unpopular-speech-in-a-cold-climate [https://perma.cc/6LRD-AAE5] (arguing that 
Harvard’s willingness to remove attorney and professor Ron Sullivan from his dean position 
for representing Harvey Weinstein undermines democratic values and the rights of 
defendants). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). 
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the sentencing judge.15  Indeed, in capital cases, the Court has held that the 
prosecution may call victims’ family members to give testimony relevant to 
the jury’s decision whether to impose a death sentence.16  Although the aim 
is to inform the judge’s or jury’s sentencing decision,17 a victim’s “impact 
statement” can be emotionally satisfying, and perhaps even somewhat 
healing, regardless of whether it influences the sentence imposed.18 
At times, victims’ presentations at sentencing appear to be intended less to 
assist the sentencing judge than to fulfill the victims’ need for public self-
expression.  For example, at the sentencing of Dr. Larry Nassar for sexually 
abusing Olympic gymnasts, more than 160 victims spoke before the sentence 
was pronounced, and the district judge praised their courage while 
condemning Nassar.19  As we noted in an earlier article, the judge’s “[c]ritics 
argued that she abandoned the proper role of neutral arbiter, took sides, and 
inappropriately broadcast her views.”  But even if the judge’s conduct and 
statements in the sentencing hearing raised concerns, this was certainly an 
appropriate setting in which to hear from victims.  The judge no longer “had 
to maintain a neutral stance.  The defendant ha[d] been convicted and the 
purpose [was] to draw on all sorts of information,” including victim 
statements, “to find the right punishment and justify the sentence imposed.”20 
In Epstein’s case in New York, the posthumous hearing closely resembled 
Nassar’s sentencing hearing and was almost certainly inspired by it.  In a 
federal courtroom filled with reporters, women recounted being sexually 
assaulted by Epstein and how their lives suffered as a result.21  The important 
differences between the Nassar and Epstein hearings were contextual and 
 
 15. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (“Victim impact evidence is simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused 
by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing 
authorities.”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Weinstein, J.): 
Victim impact statements may also serve as a catharsis for victims, helping to 
assuage the bitterness at the fates that they have suffered.  By participating in the 
criminal proceeding, victims realize that they are recognized as important by the 
court.  The proceeding is not merely about the criminal, but it also accounts for the 
person most affected by the crime.  Simply giving this person a chance to speak and 
be heard can have a beneficial effect.  Instead of the victim feeling depersonalized 
and forgotten by the legal processes, she can feel that her situation was properly 
understood and considered. 
Id. at 251; Jamie Balson, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Facilitating Healing in Crime Victims, 
6 PHOENIX L. REV. 1017, 1031 (2013) (“Historically and at present, the primary function of a 
victim impact statement has been expressive or therapeutic; to provide crime victims with a 
voice regardless of the impact it may have on the sentence itself.”).  But see Walls v. State, 
986 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1999) (reversing sentence and remanding for resentencing where trial 
judge, observing that “part of the reason for a victim impact statement is for healing and 
therapy,” allowed the victim’s family to testify at sentencing regarding uncharged crimes). 
 19. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Judicial Activism in Trial Courts, 74 NYU ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 365, 383 (2019). 
 20. Id. 
 21. United States v. Epstein, 19 CR 490 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2019 Hearing tr., at 
34–85. 
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perhaps not evident to observers.  One key difference was that Epstein had 
not first been convicted on the federal charges—indeed, he had pled not 
guilty and the trial had not begun.22  Another key difference was that Epstein 
was dead and therefore could not respond to what was said about him.  A 
third difference was that in Epstein’s case, there was no contested question 
on which the judge plausibly needed to hear argument or take testimony:  
none of the speakers opposed the prosecution’s motion to dismiss Epstein’s 
indictment nor could they credibly do so. 
The court’s decision to allow Epstein’s accusers to speak in a New York 
federal courtroom may have been informed by their shabby treatment more 
than a decade earlier.  As a Miami Herald reporter revealed in a later series 
of stories, federal prosecutors in Miami drafted a lengthy indictment against 
Epstein for sex trafficking but were then persuaded not to charge him.23  
Instead, they entered a deal in which he pled guilty to two state felony charges 
(solicitation of prostitution and procurement of minors for prostitution) in 
state court, where he received a short jail sentence followed by favorable 
treatment by his jailors.24  The non-prosecution agreement also provided 
immunity in Florida to others with whom Epstein worked.  Although the 
federal prosecutors had previously led Epstein’s accusers to believe that they 
would get the chance to weigh in on how the prosecutors would proceed in 
Epstein’s case, they did not follow through.  To the contrary, the prosecutors 
never gave the accusers notice of their decision or of the guilty plea 
proceeding in state court, with the result that the accusers and their counsel 
could not object either in the federal prosecutors’ office or in state court.25 
In 2019, Judge Marra in Miami wrote a long and critical opinion holding 
that the prosecutors should have notified Epstein’s accusers before 
concluding a deal to forego federal charges.26  The matter of the appropriate 
remedy was still undecided when Epstein, who was a party to the proceeding, 
died.  But even after Epstein’s death, his Florida accusers continued to press 
for remedies under the CVRA, and particularly for rescission of Epstein’s 
non-prosecution agreement.  Epstein’s accusers argued that Epstein could no 
longer assert his rights,27 but they still could.  But the Florida district judge 
concluded that the accusers had it backwards, because Epstein’s death ended 
 
 22. United States v. Epstein, 19 CR 490 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.), Criminal Docket (indicating 
not guilty pleas entered on July 8, 2019). 
 23. Doe v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1205-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 24. Id. at 1207, 1213–14; Doe v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1338–40 (S.D. Fla. 
2011); Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump Cabinet Member Gave a Serial Sex Abuser the 
Deal of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html [https://perma.cc/8YTZ-
LXS7]. 
 25. Doe v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1208–16. 
 26. Id. at 1218–21. 
 27. In response to Epstein’s attorneys’ argument that the accusers’ request was now moot, 
the accusers retorted that since Epstein is dead, “he should no longer have a voice in [the] 
proceeding.”  Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 v. United States, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA, 
Opinion and Order, Sept. 16, 2019, at 4. 
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the case, and with it the court’s ability to grant them relief.28  Nonetheless, 
he consented to the use of his court for a voluntary “forum” in which 
Epstein’s accusers could make “victim impact statements” for the benefit of 
prosecutors and the press.29 
Given how federal prosecutors had been pilloried for mishandling the 
Florida case, that Epstein had become a focal point of the #MeToo 
movement,30 the extraordinary media attention to Epstein’s New York 
prosecution, and Epstein’s evasion of prosecution by taking his own life, one 
can understand federal judges’ desire to give Epstein’s accusers “their Larry 
Nassar moment.”31  Neither the federal prosecutors nor Epstein’s lawyers 
objected.32  Each judge found a different, clever way to oblige the accusers.  
Judge Berman convened a hearing, purportedly focusing on whether to 
dismiss the indictment, at which, rather than speaking to that question, the 
accusers could discuss Epstein’s criminal behavior and its impact on them.  
Judge Marra recognized that no hearing was needed on whether the litigation 
was over, and rejected the premise that the accusers still had rights under the 
CVRA.  But he adopted a different stratagem, inviting the accusers and the 
prosecution to hold a “forum” in his courtroom.  Neither judge addressed 
whether the hearing or forum, while of undoubted benefit to Epstein’s 
accusers, impinged on the fair process rights of the dead criminal defendant.  
Likewise, neither judge considered how future criminal defendants might 
perceive these judicial proceedings. 
 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. at 8, n.4. 
 30. See, e.g., Ellis Kashmore, What the Jeffrey Epstein Case Means for #MeToo, FAIR 
OBSERVER (Aug. 10, 2019); Katie Reilly, How the #MeToo Movement Helped Make New 
Charges Against Jeffrey Epstein Possible, TIME (July 9, 2019). 
 31. See Liz Spikol, Jeffrey Epstein’s Victims Will Never Have Their Larry Nassar Moment 
Now | Perspective, PHIL. INQUIRER (Aug. 12, 2019, 10:47 AM), 
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/jeffrey-epstein-suicide-larry-nassar-sexual-
abuse-20190812.html [https://perma.cc/H39S-DFSK]. 
 32. Although the prosecutors surely sympathized with Epstein’s accusers and took their 
interests to heart, the prosecutors may still have thought the hearing was a bad idea.  For one, 
the prosecutors may have regarded the hearing as a bad precedent in future cases where the 
accusers want to weigh in on a question or otherwise to express themselves but the law does 
not accord them a right to do so.  The prosecutors may also have worried that accusers’ 
decision to speak or their statements at the hearing might undermine their credibility at a future 
trial of Epstein’s co-conspirators.  But it would have been a public relations nightmare for the 
prosecutors to express a dissenting view. 
  Nor, as a practical matter, could Epstein’s former lawyers object.  At that point, they 
no longer had a client from whom to take direction.  Under conventional professional 
understandings, their role as counsel had ended with Epstein’s death.  See Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 31(2)(b) (2000) (“[A] lawyer’s actual authority to represent 
a client ends when . . . the client dies”).  Any expression of concern about the hearing would 
be poorly received and have no influence on the judge.  And, at that point, it hardly mattered:  
Epstein’s reputation could not get worse.  Although many villains had previously been 
prosecuted in Manhattan’s federal court, including spies, murderers, mob bosses and drug 
kingpins, few criminal defendants have been more vilified in the popular press before a trial 
in that court had even begun. 
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II.  FAIR PROCESS FOR DEAD CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
There is a body of federal court decisions on what courts should do when 
a criminal defendant dies before the case is over.33  The understanding 
running through all the decisions is that the case may not continue, and the 
defendant may not be punished posthumously, if the criminal proceedings 
have not run their course, including not just through the conclusion of the 
trial but also through the decision of any appeal that has been filed.  If the 
proceeding is still ongoing when the defendant dies, the indictment must be 
dismissed, restoring the dead defendant to the position of one against whom 
charges had never been filed—which is to say, presumed innocent in the eyes 
of the law.34 
For example, in a 2017 decision of the Second Circuit, the court reaffirmed 
the “well-established doctrine” that “when a criminal defendant dies pending 
an appeal as of right, his conviction abates, the underlying indictment is 
dismissed, and his estate is relieved of any obligation to pay a criminal fine 
imposed at sentence.”35  Even if the defendant had been tried and found 
guilty, that result would not be conclusive if the appeal remained unresolved:  
despite the guilty verdict, the court would still have to put the deceased 
defendant back in the position of one who had never been charged.  Quoting 
from an earlier opinion, the court stated emphatically:  “‘the appeal does not 
just disappear, and the case is not merely dismissed.  Instead, everything 
associated with the case is extinguished, leaving the defendant as if he had 
never been indicted or convicted.’”36 
The Second Circuit identified two considerations animating this doctrine, 
but observed that the one that “more readily supports the far-reaching 
consequences of” the abatement doctrine is the one “‘grounded in procedural 
due process concerns.’”37  That is, in the case of a criminal defendant who 
 
 33. See e.g., Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (stating that lower federal 
courts have been correct in unanimously applying the rule that “death pending direct review 
of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all proceedings had in the 
prosecution from its inception”); United States v. Libous, 858 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam). 
 34. See, e.g., Libous, 858 F.3d at 68–69 (when defendant died pending appeal, in addition 
to vacating the conviction and dismissing the indictment, court must order the return of any 
fines paid); United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[E]ven though 
death has effected an abatement of further proceedings against [the deceased defendant] as a 
matter of law, fairness requires more than simply dismissing his appeal as moot . . . . [W]e 
believe it just and appropriate to follow our established practice by dismissing [his] appeal as 
moot, vacating the conviction entered against him, and remanding the case to the district court 
for dismissal of the outstanding indictment as to him.”); United States v. Pogue, 19 F.3d 663, 
666–67 (explaining that when the defendant died pending appeal—even though the defendant 
pled guilty and may only have intended to challenge his sentence on appeal—the trial court 
must vacate the conviction and the order of restitution and dismiss the indictment). 
 35. Libous, 858 F.3d at 66. 
 36. Id. (quoting United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (en 
banc)). 
 37. Id. (quoting United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2006)).  The other 
rationale is that once the defendant dies, the purpose of punishment can no longer be served. 
Id. 
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appeals from a conviction, “‘the interests of justice ordinarily require that a 
defendant not stand convicted without resolution of the merits of an 
appeal.’”38 
One might view this doctrine as unnecessarily protective of the procedural 
interests of a dead person.  From the popular perspective, even assuming one 
is disposed to give a defendant the benefit of the doubt before the trial begins, 
one’s attitude is likely to shift once the jury returns its verdict and the trial 
judge imposes a sentence.  But from the law’s perspective, the commitment 
to fair process commands a different attitude.  In the eyes of the criminal law, 
the deceased defendant must be regarded as innocent, and conclusively so, 
unless the appellate process is complete.  And the trial court must give 
expression to the criminal law by dismissing the indictment rather than 
allowing its allegations to remain in place unanswered.  Otherwise, the court 
might be perceived as giving credence to the indictment’s premise that the 
accused committed the crimes alleged there. 
Needless to say, if a district court has no choice but to dismiss an 
indictment when the convicted defendant dies before his appeal is decided, 
the district court has no choice but to dismiss the indictment when, as in 
Epstein’s case, the defendant dies before a trial has even begun:  the court 
must treat the accused as innocent for all legal or judicial purposes, regardless 
of popular sentiment or assumptions to the contrary. 
Further, if a court cannot allow a guilty verdict to remain in place for the 
defendant whose appeal was undecided, and cannot allow an indictment to 
remain in place when the defendant dies before proceedings conclude, the 
court cannot initiate further proceedings for purposes of imposing 
punishment on a dead defendant.  Punishment, of course, comes in many 
forms.  It may include loss of liberty or monetary sanctions.  But punishment 
can also consist of public shaming, including the opprobrium that 
accompanies a judicial declaration that one is guilty of a crime.39  The due 
process concerns for a dead defendant that require the trial judge to dismiss 
the decedent’s indictment should also preclude that judge from publicly 
conveying that the decedent was guilty as charged and from inflicting public 
disgrace and humiliation.  But that is precisely what the two federal judges 
did in Epstein’s case.  The judges repeatedly acknowledged Epstein’s 
accusers to be his “victims,” not “putative victims” or “alleged victims.”  
This conveyed the courts’ conclusion that Epstein had in fact victimized the 
women, notwithstanding that the sex trafficking charges against him in New 
York, to which he pled “not guilty,” had to be dismissed, and he was never 
charged with sex trafficking in federal court in Florida.  The judicial 
 
 38. Id. (quoting United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 39. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97–98 (2003) (“Some colonial punishments indeed 
were meant to inflict public disgrace.  Humiliated offenders were required ‘to stand in public 
with signs cataloguing their offenses.’ . . . At times the labeling would be permanent:  [a] 
murderer might be branded with an ‘M,’ and a thief with a ‘T.’ . . . The aim was to make these 
offenders suffer ‘permanent stigmas, which in effect cast the person out of the community.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
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proceedings for the accusers’ benefit were calculated to reinforce the popular 
view that Epstein was guilty and deserving of public condemnation. 
To say that due process concerns foreclosed the district court from 
continuing the pretrial proceedings against Epstein in absentia for purposes 
of public shaming is not necessarily to contend that deceased defendants have 
due process rights.  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no 
person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”40  While other laws or procedures may benefit deceased criminal 
defendants—for example, some convicted defendants have been pardoned 
posthumously when it was later established that they were wrongly 
convicted41—one might argue that a deceased person is not a “person” within 
the meaning of these constitutional provisions. 
But regardless of whether the dead have constitutional rights, the law still 
has concern for dead defendants’ procedural interests.  The attorney-client 
privilege illustrates this point.  One might suppose that because the privilege 
belongs to the client, the privilege evaporates upon the client’s death because 
the client is no longer around to assert it.  But just the opposite is true, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.42  The Court 
identified “weighty reasons that counsel in favor of posthumous application” 
of the privilege, even though the client could no longer complain personally 
if the court required counsel to breach the dead client’s confidences.  The 
Court justified this broad interpretation of the privilege not only out of 
respect for the interests of the deceased but in order to reassure living clients 
that the courts will continue to protect the confidentiality of their 
communications with counsel even after they are dead.43 
Just as living clients are reassured by courts’ abiding commitment to 
protecting clients’ privileged communications even after the clients’ death, 
defendants (and the public generally) are more likely to have confidence in 
judges’ fairness if, even after a defendant’s death, judges maintain their 
commitment to procedural fairness to the accused, including the presumption 
of innocence.  Conversely, if judges feel free, after an untried defendant’s 
death, to express their belief in the defendant’s guilt, future defendants may 
understandably worry about the strength of judges’ commitment in general 
to this rule-of-law principle.  Defendants (and the public) may conclude (as 
 
 40. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV. 
 41. See, e.g., Texas: Dead Inmate Exonerated, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/us/07brfs-DEADINMATEIS_BRF.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q69G-M8AZ] (describing the posthumous pardon of Timothy Cole). 
 42. 524 U.S. 399 (1998). 
 43. See id. at 407: 
Knowing that communications will remain confidential even after death encourages 
the client to communicate fully and frankly with counsel.  While the fear of 
disclosure, and the consequent withholding of information from counsel, may be 
reduced if disclosure is limited to posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it 
seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether.  Clients may be concerned 
about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family.  Posthumous 
disclosure of such communications may be as feared as disclosure during the client’s 
lifetime. 
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some undoubtedly suspect already) that judges merely pay lip service to the 
presumption of innocence but, having made up their minds well in advance 
of a jury verdict, judges secretly favor the prosecution throughout the trial. 
III.  JUDICIAL SUBTERFUGE IN THE EPSTEIN CASES 
In Epstein’s cases, the federal judges in New York and Florida could 
conceivably have been more straightforward and candid following his death.  
One can imagine them saying essentially:   
now that Epstein is dead, we can say what we have thought all along 
because we read the same periodicals and social media accounts as 
everyone else.  We assume that Epstein was guilty of horrible sexual 
offenses and ruined many young women’s lives.  By taking his own life, he 
deprived those women of the satisfaction of seeing him found guilty, of 
speaking at his sentencing hearing, and of then seeing him sentenced and 
kept behind bars for the rest of his life.  But as a judge, I can give those 
women some small measure of comfort by allowing them to speak in court 
at a proceeding that looks just like a sentencing hearing—a proceeding in 
which our judicial presence lends credence to the women’s accounts and 
implicitly conveys our own belief that Epstein is guilty. 
If the judges had acknowledged that this is what they were doing, the 
public would have cheered.  No doubt, the judges did not proceed so boldly 
because, even if there were no opportunity for appellate review, such blatant 
defiance of fair process values would open them more widely to criticism 
and perhaps even to complaints of judicial misconduct.  They may have 
assumed that more subtle approaches would escape notice or even be 
applauded.  But, in our view, their approaches were no better and, in some 
ways, worse. 
In the case of the New York judge, the pretense that there was a legal 
obligation to conduct a public hearing on the prosecution’s motion to dismiss 
Epstein’s indictment, and an attendant legal obligation to let the victims 
speak at such a hearing, simply heaped deception upon lawlessness.  To begin 
with, the idea was predicated on the assumption that the judge had discretion 
not to dismiss the indictment and therefore would benefit from views on the 
question.  But as we have shown, it was a foregone conclusion that the judge 
would dismiss the indictment and the accusers’ views were irrelevant to that 
determination.  As a matter of law, the prosecution could not continue against 
Epstein after his death, which was an uncontested fact.  Unsurprisingly, no 
party argued to keep the prosecution open, and neither the judge nor the 
accusers’ counsel could cite a prior federal case where, after a criminal 
defendant’s death, the judge held a hearing to decide whether or not to 
dismiss the indictment.44 
 
 44. The judge cited one painfully inapposite decision, United States v. Heaton, 458 F. 
Supp.2d 1271 (D. Utah 2006), to justify the hearing. United States v. Epstein, 19 CR 490 
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2019 Hearing tr., at 7–8.  In Heaton, the prosecution moved “in 
the interest of justice” to dismiss an indictment charging the defendant with unlawful sexual 
activity with a minor. 458 F. Supp.2d at 1271–72.  Before deciding the motion, the court 
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Further, even if there had genuinely been some question about how to 
proceed after Epstein’s death, and the judge might have benefitted from the 
parties’ views, there was no obligation to hold a hearing in court.  Federal 
judges do not hold public hearings on every question that comes their way in 
a criminal case and they have no obligation to do so.  Of course, a guilty plea, 
trial, or sentencing must be public, and the parties must have a chance to 
speak.  But motions in which the facts are not in dispute are generally decided 
without a hearing.  Motions hearings are designed to address contested issues 
of fact or law.  In this case, there was neither.  When the relevant facts are 
undisputed and there is no legal question on which the judge would benefit 
from argument, judges conventionally decide motions on the papers.45 
Moreover, even assuming there was a legitimate reason for a hearing, the 
accusers had no right to speak at it.  As a general matter, only the prosecution 
and defense have the right to be heard in a public proceeding in a federal 
criminal case.  Third parties who might be moved to speak have no general 
right to do so.46 
The district judge claimed that the CVRA47 required giving Epstein’s 
accusers a chance to speak.  That finding, though, was not based on a 
plausible reading of the federal victims’ rights law.  Like analogous state 
laws, the CVRA establishes victims’ right to be heard at specified 
proceedings in the course of a criminal case.  In federal criminal cases, a 
crime victim has “[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding 
 
directed the prosecutor to confer with the alleged victim and then to communicate her views 
regarding the motion to the court.  Of course, this decision was different from Epstein’s case, 
as Judge Berman essentially conceded. United States v. Epstein at 7.  To begin with, Heaton 
involved a living defendant against whom the prosecution could continue, which placed a 
burden on the prosecution to justify its decision to end the prosecution.  The prosecution had 
not offered such a justification, and, therefore, the district court was not legally compelled to 
grant the prosecution’s motion to dismiss the indictment as it was in Epstein’s case, and may 
have benefitted from a hearing.  Second, the court in Heaton did not order a hearing at which 
the alleged victim would speak, but ordered that the motion would be decided on the papers. 
458 F. Supp.2d at 1273.  Third, the court did not solicit the equivalent of a “victim impact 
statement” but sought the alleged victim’s view (to be transmitted by the prosecutor in writing) 
on a question legitimately before the court, namely, whether the indictment should be 
dismissed in the interest of justice.  Fourth, the CVRA contemplates the procedure that was 
employed, insofar as it provides victims a “right to confer with” the prosecutor before a 
prosecution is abandoned. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2018).  While the court in Heaton explained 
its decision as an application of the victim’s statutory right to be treated fairly, the case 
provides no conceivable support for the proposition that fair treatment of victims means that 
before dismissing an indictment against a dead defendant as a matter of law, the court may or 
must convene a judicial hearing to allow accusers to denounce the defendant.  Finally, insofar 
as it relied on victims’ statutory right to fair treatment, Heaton itself reflected an expansive, 
and debatable, application of the CVRA. 
 45. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 329 (1986) 
(“‘[I]f motions are so simple or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary 
advisement time should be considerably less than 30 days.’” (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-212, at 
34)). 
 46. Third parties who come to have a legal stake in the criminal proceeding—for example, 
witnesses who are threatened with a contempt citation for refusing to produce documents or 
to testify—have a right to be heard before their rights are adjudicated.  But they are the 
exception. 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2018). 
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in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole 
proceeding.”48  This excludes the overwhelming majority of proceedings that 
may take place in a criminal case—including the anomalous proceedings at 
issue here.  The law identifies particular proceedings where crime victims, 
although not formally parties to the criminal case, have significant interests 
at stake.  With the exception of “release” decisions, which implicate putative 
victims’ safety, the proceedings all follow a guilty plea or an adjudication of 
guilt.  The specified proceedings are those where an accuser’s statement 
might influence a contested judicial decision as to which the judge has 
discretion.  In Epstein’s case, the accusers had no comparable interests at 
stake or contributions to make, the facts were not contested, and the judge 
had no discretion.  The only option was, as both parties agreed, to dismiss 
the case. 
The federal victims’ rights law reflects a balancing of the interests of crime 
victims (or putative victims), criminal defendants, and the prosecution.  It 
may be in crime victims’ or accusers’ interest to have a voice at every phase 
of a criminal proceeding, but victims’ rights laws carefully limit the extent to 
which victims may participate.49  Here, on its face, federal law accorded 
victims no right to be heard at a proceeding on a motion to dismiss an 
indictment on account of the defendant’s death.  Unlike, say, a proceeding 
on whether to dismiss an indictment against a living defendant as part of a 
bargain, this could not be analogized to a “plea” proceeding or to any other 
proceeding covered by the statute.  There was no discretionary decision to 
make.  As Judge Marra found, Epstein’s death ended the victims’ rights under 
the CVRA in general.  And even if the law applied, it certainly did not afford 
accusers the right to make pretrial victim impact statements. 
IV.  WHY JUDGES’ UNFAIRNESS TO DEAD DEFENDANTS MATTERS TO THE 
LIVING 
If one assumes, as the district court evidently did, that Epstein’s accusers 
were in fact victims of sexual offenses, the public had a strong interest in 
offering therapeutic assistance.  Much attention has been given to how 
criminal proceedings can re-victimize or re-traumatize victims of a crime.  
Procedures have been adopted to minimize the extent to which the criminal 
process harms victims.  Although Susan Herman has argued convincingly 
that most of the state’s work in helping victims heal must take place outside 
the criminal process,50 others believe the criminal process can play a positive 
role in promoting healing.  In particular, they believe victims experience a 
healing process when judges award restitution or impose retributive 
sentences as well as when victims speak voluntarily at sentencing hearings.  
In Epstein’s case, the district judges evidently believed that a posthumous 
 
 48. Id. § 3771(a)(4). 
 49. See generally Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. 
& POL’Y 229 (2005). 
 50. SUSAN HERMAN, PARALLEL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2010). 
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opportunity for Epstein’s accusers to have their say would serve a similar 
role.51  But the opportunity came at a cost. 
While Epstein’s accusers wanted to speak in these proceedings, the hearing 
sent a demoralizing and misleading message to victims in general:  what they 
have to say does not really matter to the outcome of a proceeding.  Victims’ 
statutory right to speak at sentencing and other post-conviction proceedings 
should not be meant, as it was here, simply to promote self-expression or 
therapy.  Victims should perceive that they have, and should actually have, 
an opportunity to appropriately influence judges’ decisions.  But the Epstein 
proceedings sent the opposite message.  In New York, there was no 
possibility that Judge Berman’s decision whether to dismiss the charges, or 
any other judicial decision, would be affected by anything Epstein’s accusers 
said in court.  And in Miami, there is not even a pretense that an in-court, 
post-litigation “forum” will make a difference to the litigation, which is now 
over.  Future victims may come away from this with the impression that 
judges have no intention of considering what they have to say but are only 
going through statutorily prescribed motions, condescendingly affording a 
right to therapeutic self-expression rather than a true role in the proceedings.  
That would be unfortunate, both because victims’ statements deserve to be 
considered when the law deems it appropriate, and because victims may be 
discouraged from speaking if they perceive the opportunity to be just for 
show. 
Further, the proceedings were calculated to influence pending and future 
proceedings against Epstein’s estate and Epstein’s co-conspirators, which 
was almost certainly one of the objectives of the accusers’ counsel.  Everyone 
recognized that more proceedings would follow.  The prosecutors were 
explicit that their investigation of possible co-conspirators was ongoing, and 
it was likewise no secret that the accusers would seek civil damages against 
the estate.  The accusers’ lawyers have an interest in maintaining public 
sympathy for their clients and cause.  But professional conduct rules limit the 
accusers’ lawyers’ ability to discuss the cases in the press, on television, or 
elsewhere in public media knowing that what they said is substantially likely 
to materially prejudice pending or future civil or criminal proceedings.52  
Further, their clients’ statements in court would likely gain more coverage, 
reach a larger audience, and ultimately be more influential than whatever the 
accusers and their lawyers might say outside court.  The concern for 
protecting the fairness of future proceedings should have discouraged the 
federal judges from providing Epstein’s accusers a judicial hearing or forum 
 
 51. In Epstein’s case, the district judge assumed that, at the very least, he had discretion 
to afford Epstein’s accusers a hearing before dismissing the indictment and concluding the 
proceedings.  The judge cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which allows federal 
district judges to regulate their practice in any manner that is not inconsistent with the district 
court rules and other law.  We leave to another day whether the federal statute implicitly 
denied the court discretion to allow accusers to speak in court proceedings different from, and 
not analogous to, the ones identified in the law—that is, not involving release, plea, 
sentencing, or parole. 
 52. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6. 
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that would lead to extensive media coverage of statements scripted by 
lawyers. 
The proceedings also undermine respect for judicial integrity because of 
their transparently pretextual nature.  Judges, who often call parties, lawyers, 
and witnesses to account when they are deceptive about their motivations, 
should be honest about their own.  In Epstein’s cases, both federal judges 
sought to pass off their proceedings as if they were unexceptional and 
unremarkable.  Acting as if the hearing was a routine one under the CVRA, 
Judge Berman pretended to need the accusers’ views on an uncertain 
procedural question.  And one might have supposed from Judge Marra’s 
nonchalance in offering his courtroom for the media to cover the accusers’ 
public statements that courtrooms are routinely used for public fora of this 
nature.  They are not. 
But, in our view, the largest cost is to confidence in fair process.  Although 
most criminal cases are tried in state court, federal judges preside over high 
profile cases that shape how the public understands the criminal process.  
Many publicly vilified individuals, including alleged spies, murderers, mob 
bosses, and drug kingpins, are brought to federal court with the promise that 
they will receive a fair trial.  In many of these cases, the public widely 
assumes from the start, based on media accounts, that the defendants are 
guilty as charged.  Certainly, the prosecution will see the accused as guilty 
and otherwise would not bring charges.  The one public official most 
responsible for giving effect to the presumption of innocence, and to due 
process rights in general, is the judge.  Proceedings such as in the Epstein 
cases that employ stratagems to circumvent procedural conventions for a 
sympathetic cause erode confidence in the judiciary’s commitment to 
procedural fairness. 
V.  CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF 
INNOCENCE 
The Epstein cases in New York and Miami illustrate how courts may 
respond to the pressure of popular social and cultural movements by eroding 
fair process values.  In endorsing women’s unproven accusations of sexual 
misconduct by opening their courts to “victim impact” proceedings against 
an alleged sex offender, now deceased, two federal judges appeared to 
succumb to the popular pressure of the #MeToo movement and its slogan, 
“believe women.”53 
 
 53. See, e.g., Marie Solis, When Believing Women Isn’t Enough to Help Them, VICE (Oct. 
9, 2018, 4:46 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gyemm3/when-believing-women-
isnt-enough-to-help-them [https://perma.cc/R735-ZAGD] (observing that the “#MeToo 
movement . . . took off in 2017 . . . [and] made ‘believe women’ its rallying cry”).  The 
#MeToo movement has spawned an analogous slogan, “believe survivors.”  This too has the 
potential to substitute blind faith for a respectful willingness to hear and investigate accusers’ 
allegations. See Emly Yoffe, The Problem with #BelieveSurvivors, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/brett-kavanaugh-and-problem-
believesurvivors/572083/ [https://perma.cc/LX7C-3GX6]. 
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The concept of “believe women” is ambiguous.  Its proponents may be 
seeking to eliminate the perceived practice of reflexively disbelieving 
women’s accusations of sexual misconduct.  The slogan can be read as a 
rebuke to these biased assumptions that may have led the public and media 
to discount women’s accusations.54  In the context of the criminal process, 
“believe women” responds to the perception that law enforcement officers 
historically dismissed rape victims, which further traumatized them and left 
a whole class of crimes unpunished.  Accordingly, some reformers correctly 
urge investigators to be no more skeptical of accounts of women who report 
sexual violence than they would be with other complaints.  They should treat 
these accusers with dignity, as they should all complainants, and follow up 
by investigating credible sexual assault reports, rather than dismissing them 
out of hand.55 
On the other hand, “believe women” often seems directed at everyone in 
and out of the criminal process, instructing them to believe women accusers 
at all stages rather than accumulating and analyzing all the available evidence 
and making independent judgments of credibility.  As one writer has put it, 
“‘believe women’ means believing women without exception.”56  The theory 
underlying this strong, and perhaps conclusive, presumption is that women 
are not motivated to lie about sexual misconduct, especially given the strong 
disincentive to make even truthful accusations, and that, as an empirical 
matter, women almost never do make false accusations. 
Some reject the theory and its underlying empirical assumptions.57  But 
even if one accepts both, “believe women” is incompatible with the criminal 
process.  In making their charging decision, prosecutors should not 
presumptively believe or disbelieve women or anyone else.  They should 
resist biased assumptions about accusers and accusations and should instead 
 
 54. See, e.g., Emily Crockett, Rape and Sexual Assault Are Common.  So Why Don’t We 
Believe Victims?, VOX (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:23 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/5/1/11538748/believe-rape-victims [https://perma.cc/F5DQ-
89ZM]. 
 55. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women:  Sexual Violence and the Credibility 
Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2017).  Even the idea that criminal investigators should 
initially believe accusers has been questioned. See Dan Subotnik, Why Not Believe Women in 
Sexual Assault Cases?:  An Engagement with Professors Tuerkheimer, Colb, and Many 
Others, 34 TOURO L. REV. 995, 1022 (2018) (“In sum, while sexual assault claims must be 
investigated, we cannot create a strong presumption of guilt within a larger system of 
presumed innocence.  Accepting women’s testimony at face value, ignores the role of 
jealousy, shame, regret, and unfulfilled needs.  Consideration of these factors should satisfy 
any standard of scrutiny required under Equal Protection.”). 
 56. Jenny Hollander, Why “Believe Women” Means Believing Women Without Exception, 
BUSTLE (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/why-believe-women-means-believing-
women-without-exception-5532903 [https://perma.cc/94ZS-7YWY].  At its extreme, “believe 
women” is chillingly reminiscent of the earlier slogan, “believe the children,” which was 
popularized in the 1980s in support of the McMartin child abuse prosecution, which was 
eventually recognized as disastrously unfair. See David P. Elder, Comment, Investigation and 
Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 249, 257–87 (1991). 
 57. See, e.g., Christine Rosen, Don’t Believe All Women, Because Some Are Terrible, 
COMMENTARY, Sept. 19, 2019, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/politics-ideas/dont-
believe-all-women-because-some-are-terrible/ [https://perma.cc/WHH6-WJWH]. 
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make credibility determinations as objectively as possible.  If left without 
probable cause, police should not make arrests, and if left with reasonable 
doubts, prosecutors should not pursue charges. 
More importantly, whatever one might conclude about the professional 
responsibilities of investigators and prosecutors, trial judges must stand for 
fair process.  Presuming women accusers’ truthfulness is antithetical to the 
presumption of innocence.  It would be reversible error, for example, if a 
judge were to instruct the jury to presume that women who were complaining 
witnesses testified truthfully.58  Such an instruction would be tantamount to 
telling jurors that the defendant should be presumed guilty of alleged 
offenses.  That would stand due process on its head.  Of course, once they 
retire to deliberate, jurors are free to draw upon their experience, which may 
lead them to assume that accusers have no reason to lie and should therefore 
be believed.  But judges cannot tell jurors that, as a matter of law, they may 
or must start out with such an understanding. It would be especially 
problematic to give such an instruction based on the group identity of the 
accuser.59 
The New York and Miami judges were not so blatant as to instruct trial 
jurors to “believe women.”  But their unorthodox conduct of the proceedings 
following Epstein’s death, against the background of the #MeToo movement, 
looked to all the world like an affirmation and adoption of  the movement 
along with one of its central premises.  We have previously written in praise 
of trial court activism,60 but the Epstein cases call for considering the limits.  
By ordering or endorsing the equivalent of a sentencing hearing in the case 
of a deceased defendant who had never been tried, the judges capitulated to 
a powerful social moment.  The judge in Nassar’s case did the same, but she 
did not compromise the presumption of innocence in doing so.  The judges 
in Epstein’s case did damage to the judiciary as an institution by applying her 
approach outside the sentencing context.  Their departure from traditional 
procedure and process encroaches on important fair process values. 
The judges took the wrong lesson from the #MeToo movement.  To the 
extent that victims of sexual offenses were traditionally treated poorly by 
police, prosecutors, and judges, it is important to correct the historic 
imbalance.  Insofar as it advocates more rigorous enforcement and severe 
punishment of credible sexual assault claims against powerful white men, the 
#MeToo movement may be in tension with progressive criminal justice 
reform,61 but it does not necessarily conflict with fair criminal process.  The 
tenet “believe women” when applied in the courtroom certainly does. 
 
 58. United States v. Verner, 748 F.2d 925, 926–27 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 59. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(A) cmts. 1, 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
 60. Green & Roiphe, supra note 19, at 382–85. 
 61. See Guy HamiltonSmith, The Agony & the Ecstasy of #MeToo:  The Hidden Cost of 
Reliance on Carceral Politics, SW. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427857 [https://perma.cc/DA5W-
FMXS].  Smith argues that the focus of the #MeToo movement on punishing rape or sexual 
abuse more severely is at odds with the goal of reducing mass incarceration and will end up 
affecting others accused of sex crimes, the majority of whom are poor and people of color.  
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The goal of equal treatment for all in the criminal justice system is 
essential, but it should exist side-by-side with, and not supplant, the 
procedural protections that courts must afford all defendants.  Courts should 
address inequality in law enforcement and the disparate treatment of different 
classes of accused and accusers by eliminating bias and treating all with equal 
dignity rather than dispensing with fundamental procedural protections for 
certain criminal defendants.  If we expect the presumption of innocence to 
protect poor and minority defendants who make up the vast majority of those 
accused of a crime, then we have to promote that same principle when the 
accused is rich and powerful.  In the end, the best guarantee of equal 
treatment is fair processes applied in all cases.62 
When we think of despised criminal defendants, we used to think of an 
individual accused of terrorism or mass murder.  But in the current climate, 
rich and powerful men accused of sexual assault have assumed this status.  
That presents a challenge for the judiciary, which is charged with providing 
a fair process for all accused, even the most reviled such as Jeffrey Epstein.  
The best way to ensure fair treatment of women and other marginalized 
groups is not by treating the powerful unfairly but by providing an equally 
fair process to all individuals.  Judges, especially, should stand up for this 
ideal. 
 
We are similarly arguing that the erosion of procedural protections and accompanying loss of 
faith in judicial process will affect other criminal defendants who tend to be disadvantaged. 
 62. Kate Levine has made a similar argument in the context of the BlackLivesMatter 
movement. See generally Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745 
(2016).  In addition to seeking to redress the disproportionately harsh treatment of racial 
minorities by police, prosecutors and judges, the movement targets police abuse and 
emphasizes the need to punish (mostly white and male) police officers who violate the 
criminal law.  Recognizing that prosecutors have been more protective of police officers than 
of others who come under investigation, as illustrated by the St. Louis prosecutor’s 
investigation of police officer Darren Wilson for the shooting of Michael Brown, many call 
for prosecutors to treat the police as they treat others.  Levine argues, in contrast, that the more 
protective procedures adopted in cases involving the police ought to be a model for how all 
suspects are treated. Id. 
